Religion, Postmodernization, and Israeli Approaches to the Conflict with the Palestinians

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This article analyzes the relationship between religion and Israeli approaches to the conflict with the Palestinians. It seeks to explain why religion has become closely correlated with hawkishness since 1967. While the Jewish religion advocates no single approach to the conflict with the Palestinians, the religious have been significantly more hawkish than the nonreligious in Israel. This is because religion in Israel has reinforced ethnocentricity among the Jewish public, which in turn is highly correlated with hawkishness. Yet the correlation between religion and hawkishness only became politically prominent after 1967. This prominence is a function of the way religion has interacted with changes in Israeli political culture that were driven by the process of postmodernization. Whereas mainstream Israeli political culture has become less ethnocentric and more liberal, and consequently more dovish, the religious community has moved in the opposite direction. In this vein, religion has served to shield its adherents from most of the effects of postmodernization while simultaneously encouraging countervailing trends, which accounts for the polarization referred to above. In other words, it is the way religion has interacted with postmodernization that has made it the most effective incubator for hawkishness in Israel since 1967.

Introduction

On the memorial to Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin in Tel Aviv the inscription states that "a religious Jew" assassinated him. The insertion of this phrase reflects the widespread sense in Israel that religion was to blame for this tragic crime. Indeed, many claim the assassin had rabbinical sanction for his act. Religious politicians sought to have the phrase "religious Jew" removed from the memorial. They argued that religion per se was not to blame. After all, the overwhelming majority of the religious public opposed such extremism, while some important rabbis endorsed the principle of "land for peace." Clearly, the relationship between religion and the peace process in Israel is far from simple. This article analyzes the relationship between religion and Israeli approaches to the conflict with the Palestinians. In particular, it seeks to explain why religion has become closely correlated with hawkishness since 1967.

While this question is clearly of importance in the Israeli context, it is also of relevance to the broader debate regarding the role of religion in international relations. In the international relations literature, religion tends to be dismissed as an epiphenomenon. In public discourse religious fundamentalism is often portrayed as part of a "clash of civilizations," which is declared to be the most important force

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in contemporary international politics. Recently Fox and others have begun to stake out an intermediate position, which has assessed the role of religion in conflict through its relationship to other ideational variables such as ethnicity.[1] This approach provides the basis for the following analysis.

In the context of the subject at hand, religion is narrowly defined in terms of the Orthodox Jewish tradition[2] and its system of belief, doctrine, norms, and practices— as well as the distinctive lifestyle of its adherents. The distinctive lifestyle of religious Jews is not only a function of the specific beliefs, norms, and practices of the religion, but is also a function of the way the religious community lives in order for it to survive and flourish. Correspondingly, religious norms, beliefs, doctrine, and practices do not exist in a vacuum, but are constantly being interpreted and reproduced within the social and cultural context in which they are embedded. In this vein, it is important to recognize the distinction made in Israeli society between two concepts that are often understood by outsiders as synonymous, *yahadut* (Judaism) and *dat* (religion). Judaism refers to the Jewish religious tradition, in general. As such, it is constitutive of the collective identity of religious and nonreligious Israeli Jews alike. Religion is differentiated from Judaism because it hinges on the observance of halacha (Jewish Law) as interpreted by Orthodox rabbis. Consequently, the analysis will focus on religion rather than Judaism.[3]

The first half of this article surveys the relationship between religion and Israeli approaches to the conflict with the Palestinians in three ways. First, the religious discourse is examined. This discourse consists of statements and writings made by political, religious, and intellectual leaders within the religious community who consciously attempt to extrapolate the meaning of religion with regard to the peace process. Most, though by no means all, of these figures are rabbis. Second, the attitudes of the self-identified religious public toward the peace process will be examined. In this case, the religiousness of the approach refers to a person's general level of religiosity, measured on a sliding scale in terms of their level of observance of halacha and their belief in core religious precepts. Third, the actual political behaviour of the self-identified religious community with regard to the peace process is examined. This enables one to gauge how far the leadership discourse and mass orientation of the religious sector influence their practical approaches to the peace process. In each case, religious approaches are compared with nonreligious approaches in order to ascertain how the religious approach differs. This multidimensional approach provides a comprehensive basis for the analysis undertaken in the second half of the article.

The second section begins by explaining the different approaches to the peace process within the different sections of the religious community. It is argued that messianic ideology and greater ethnocentricity inform the extreme hawkish approach among religious Jews, as distinct from the more moderate approaches within the community. The focus then turns to analysis of differences between religious and nonreligious approaches, and in particular why religion is so strongly correlated with hawkishness. This analysis centers on the effects of postmodernization on religion's changing relationship with three core elements of Israeli political culture: ethnonationalism, liberalism, and republicanism. Postmodernization refers to a social and cultural process identified by Inglehart in over forty countries.[4] Postmodernization occurs among the middle class of the post–World War II generations in advanced industrial societies. It is reflected in the fact that their outlook differs from that of the older ''modern'' generations in its greater liberalism, individualism,

multiculturalism, dovishness, and greater concern for "quality of life," coupled with a decreased affinity for collectivism, organized religion, nationalism and "security values."

In this context, a two-part argument is made. First, religion in Israel is strongly correlated with an orientation toward hawkishness primarily because religion encourages ethnocentricity. Second, the political prominence of the correlation between religion and hawkishness after 1967 has to do with the way religion inter-acted with changes in mainstream Israeli political culture, which were driven and facilitated by postmodernization. In this vein, religion served to shield its adherents from most of the cultural effects of postmodernization, while simultaneously encour-aging countervailing trends. Consequently, whereas mainstream Israeli political culture has become less ethnocentric and more liberal (and thus more dovish), the religious community has moved in the opposite direction.

The Religious Discourse Regarding the Conflict: Interpreting Halacha

The religious discourse has centered on the question of whether, according to hala-cha and the religious beliefs and values that inform it, it is permissible to give up parts of the land of Israel in order to save lives. Given the lack of a central authori-tative halachic institution, many legitimate answers exist—particularly since this is a contemporary political issue related to war and peace. Because of the absence of a sovereign Jewish state for two thousand years there are few precedents for this case, and hence there is more room in which to interpretate halacha. This discourse is examined below from the vantage point of the three main Jewish religious subgroups in Israel: the ultra-Orthodox (*haredi*), the national-religious (*dati-leumi*), and Sephardi religious Jews associated with the *Shas* party.[5]

Ultra-Orthodoxy began in eastern Europe as a reaction to the threat of seculari-zation posed by the Enlightenment and modernity. The ultra-Orthodox response to this threat was to closet themselves away from the modern world in communities that concentrated on the study of religion in academies known as yeshivas. Although the ultra-Orthodox are extremely factionalized, they are united by strict observance of halacha and by their negative stance toward modernity. In general, ultra-Orthodoxy is non-Zionist and it rejects the idea that the creation of the state of Israel is part of the messianic process of redemption.

The dominant ultra-Orthodox halachic approach to the question of "land for peace" is pragmatic. Thus the foremost ultra-Orthodox rabbi from the 1970s until the late 1990s, Rabbi Eliezer Menachem Shach, ruled that it is permissible to give up parts of the land of Israel in order to save lives. Since the state of Israel is of no intrinsic religious value to Shach, neither is its control over territory—even if that territory is holy. Shach argued that the study of religion, and not control over terri-tory, is the key to the survival of the Jewish people.[6] Shach's approach was also influ-enced by the traditional quietistic political culture of ultra-Orthodoxy, according to which Jewish interests are best defended by not provoking non-Jews.[7] Within the ultra-Orthodox world two other minority approaches exist. First, there exists a tiny minority of extreme anti-Zionists known as the *Neturei Karta* sect. They are nomin-ally represented within the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Second, and more important, there is a hawkish wing of ultra-Orthodoxy represented by the *Habad* movement and *Hapoelei Agudat Yisrael*.[8] This camp attaches messianic significance to the Six Day War, fought in 1967, which brought many religiously

significant sites under Jewish control. Whereas the secular state of Israel had always been difficult for ultra-Orthodox Jews to accept, the holiness of the land of Israel was a traditional value. In this vein the then head of *Habad*, the Lubavitcher Rebbe Menachem Mendel Schneerson, declared in 1992, "Better that the nations of the world rule in the Land of Israel than Jews surrender territory voluntarily."[9]

Shas is a religious party founded and supported by Sephardi Jews. Most of the leadership of *Shas*, which was set up in 1984, are Sephardi graduates of ultra-Orthodox yeshivas, though *Shas* is not ultra-Orthodox in the full sense of the term. While *Shas* is highly critical of Zionism for secularizing the Sephardi public, the basic Zionist idea is associated with continuity of Jewish tradition and not a rebellion against tradition, as it had been in Europe. Thus in contrast to the ultra-Orthodox, *Shas* was willing to join the Israeli government. On the other hand, the proto-Zionism of Sephardi Jewry is not characterized by the strong ideological overtones present within both the secular and religious variants of Zionism prominent within Ashkenazi Jewry. Unlike Ashkenazi Jewry, the Sephardim were not directly influenced by the rise of nationalist ideologies in nineteenth century Europe. This lack of ideological fervor contributed to a pragmatic approach to the peace process.[10] Thus, in the 1970s the acknowledged leader of Sephardi Jewry in Israel, Rabbi Ovadia Yosef, ruled that it was permissible to exchange part of the land of Israel in return for peace in principle, because the saving of life is more important than either the coming of the Messiah or holy territory.[11] This was a position he continued to support until the collapse of the Oslo Accords.

Religious Zionism views the creation of the state of Israel as being of great religious, and even messianic, significance. The movement was born in Europe and its leaders were thus primarily religious Ashkenazi Jews. Ideologically the movement was more open to modernity than the ultra-Orthodox, though it did not embrace it fully in the way that Reform Judaism did. After the Six Day War, the dominant approach among the national-religious was that of Rabbi Zvi Yehuda Kook, the head of the *Mercaz Harav* yeshiva and his disciples such as the former Ashkenazi Chief Rabbi, Avraham Shapira, and the former member of Knesse (MK), Rabbi Chaim Druckman. According to Kook, it is forbidden for Jews to transfer any part of the land of Israel to non-Jews. Kook also argued that the capture of the territories in 1967 was a crucial part of the messianic process and that the return of those territories had to be prevented in order to prevent a reversal of this process.[12] Aside from this messianic ideology, the national-religious leadership also supported the construction of settlements in the territories captured in 1967, which they viewed as the fulfilment of the classic pioneering values of Zionism. While the ultra-Orthodox were generally silent regarding Palestinian rights, the national-religious did discuss the matter. The thrust of the discourse was framed between one of two positions. Some argued that the Palestinians could receive autonomy and civil (not political) rights under the halachic category of *ger toshav* (resident alien), while others such as the former Ashkenazi Chief Rabbi Shlomo Goren argued that the Palestinians had no such rights.[13]

The minority position within religious Zionism was proposed by members of the religious peace movements *Oz Ve Shalom/Netivot Shalom* and by the religious political party *Meimad*. According to leading rabbinical figures within this school, such as Rabbi Yehuda Amital and Rabbi Aaron Lichtenstein, saving life takes precedence over that of the value of the land of Israel and consequently it is permissible to trade land for peace and dismantle settlements. Other ideological themes in this discourse echoed the moderate approach with secular Zionism. Thus, religious proponents of

compromise spoke about the need for territorial compromise for demographic reasons, in order to maintain a Jewish majority within a democratic framework.[14] Religious doves also emphasized the need for withdrawal due to the high moral costs of continued occupation on Israeli society.[15]

Overall, the hawkish religious approaches to the peace process are infused with a messianic streak, according to which contemporary Jewish control over the Holy Land is seen as playing a central role in the messianic process. In contrast, the religious doves—especially the ultra-Orthodox ones—tend to downplay or ignore the messianic significance of Zionism.

Differentiating the Religious Discourse from the Nonreligious Discourse

As noted above, there are similarities between the religious and nonreligious discourses on the peace process. This is particularly evident on the radical Right where both the religious and nonreligious discourse revolves around beliefs in messianism, the uniqueness of the Jewish people, and the eternity of anti-Semitism.[16] However, overall the religious discourse is more ethnocentric and hawkish than the nonreligious discourse. While religious language is highly prominent within Israel's radical Right[17] it is largely absent from the literature of the dovish movement, "Peace Now."[18] In addition, the differences between the religious discourse and the nonreligious discourse are evident when comparing the thrust of the language used by religious and nonreligious doves. The nonreligious Left supports a Palestinian state in ideological terms, due to its commitment to the universal right of nations to self-determination and universal human rights. It views Palestinian rights as equal to Jewish rights in a fundamental sense. It is also totally opposed to settlements.[19] In contrast, the religious Left agrees with the religious Right that the fundamental Jewish right to the land is superior to that of the Palestinians because of the biblical promise made by God. Rather than being fundamentally opposed to settlements, two leading dovish rabbis, Amital and Lichtenstein, are actually the joint heads of a yeshiva situated in the West Bank. While they support compromise and withdrawal, their assessment is based on having to choose between *Conflicting Values* (the title of a *Meimad* pamphlet advocating compromise).[20] Instead of justifying compromise in terms of universal rights, religious doves emphasis the need for compromise in ethnocentric terms: because the lives of the "people of Israel" are more important than the "Land of Israel," or in order to preserve Jewish unity and prevent the moral deterioration of the Jewish people.[21]

In addition, while the nonreligious dovish discourse emphasizes its position in terms of idealism, religious doves tend to emphasize pragmatism and realism, which makes their discourse more akin to that of the nonreligious center than the left.[22] In this vein, Rabbi Shach wrote of the need to adopt a commonsense approach, not an approach based on an emotional attachment to territory. Ovadia Yosef declared that his opinion was expressly based on consultations with military and political experts.[23] Rabbi Lichtenstein cautioned against an overly idealistic approach based on the idea that the key to political success is faith.[24] Indeed, in the early 1990s virtually all ultra-Orthodox MKs identified themselves as neither hawks nor doves but as pragmatists, and nearly all identified with centrist positions on the peace process.[25] In addition, it is worth noting that *Meimad*, the party of the dovish religious Zionists, is an acronym in Hebrew for "Religious Center Party." Furthermore, despite religious moderates' support for the principle of "land for peace," they are

more cautious than the secular moderates in supporting this position. Rabbi Shach supported the 1991 Madrid Peace Conference, but in contrast to the nonreligious Israeli Left he was very skeptical of the Oslo Accords.[26] Whereas the Israeli Left reacted to the collapse of the peace process in 2000 by advocating renewed negotiations, international trusteeship, or unilateral withdrawal, Ovadia Yosef reacted by reversing his ruling on land for peace and making a number of extremely derogatory remarks about Arabs.[27]

The Religious Public and the Peace Process

Public opinion surveys since the Six Day War have consistently demonstrated a very strong relationship between religiosity and hawkishness in Israel. The surveys usually place Jewish respondents into three or four categories according to self-identification, core beliefs, and the stated level of observance of religious practices and commandments. The first category relates to the secular, the second to the traditional, and the third to the religious. This last category is sometimes broken down into two subcategories: ultra-Orthodox and national-religious. Recent surveys[28] suggest that about 20 percent of the Israeli Jewish public is religious, just under half of whom are ultra-Orthodox. About a third of the public is traditional, the rest are secular.

Between 1972 and 1981 an average of 71 percent of religious people were unwilling to return any part of the West Bank, compared to 58 percent of traditional and 47 percent of secular people (Figure 1).[29]

Between 1984 and 1993 the mean score of the "very religious" regarding the return of the territories (5 = annexation, 1 = return) was 3.8, as compared to 3.4 for the religious, 2.9 for the traditional, and 2.4 for the secular (Figure 2).[30]

In the mid- to late-1990s research suggested that religiosity was the single most important determinant of hawkish attitudes among the Jewish public in Israel. These surveys showed that between 1994 and 1997, 4 to 12 percent of the ultra-Orthodox supported Oslo as compared to 16 to 24 percent of the religious, 28 to 31 percent of the traditional, and 44 to 67 percent of the secular (Figure 3).

In 1997, 100 percent (!) of the ultra-Orthodox defined themselves as "Rightists" as compared to 81 percent of the national-religious, 55 percent of the traditional, and 22 percent of the secular. Also in 1997, 8 percent of the ultra-Orthodox believed that "the two peoples had national and civic rights in the Land of Israel" as compared to 13 percent of the religious, 17 percent of the traditional, and 36 percent


Figure 1. Average unwillingness to return all or most of the West Bank 1972–81. Data from Yael Yishai, *Land or Peace?* (Stanford: Hoover Institute, 1987) p. 185.

Figure 2. Mean unwillingness to return territory 1984–93. Data from Asher Arian, *Security Threatened* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) pp. 115–19.

of the secular.[31] Overall there is a clear progression in terms of hawkishness. The ultra-Orthodox are the most hawkish, followed by the national-religious, followed by the traditional, and lastly the secular who are the most dovish. Since the collapse of the peace process in September 2000, the general trend in Israeli public opinion has been in a hawkish direction, but nonetheless the religious public continues to be more hawkish than the public in general.[32]

Religious Political Behavior Toward the Conflict

No religious party or politician has ever been primarily responsible for Israeli foreign policy. The lack of ultimate responsibility means that they can more easily afford to take a stance based either on pure principle or ulterior motives (say, as a bargaining chip to obtain more funds for religious institutions). This is particularly true for the ultra-Orthodox, who are especially dependent on state funding as over two-thirds of ultra-Orthodox men do not work, while their cost of living is high because of very large size of the average ultra-Orthodox family. Indeed, it is estimated that the total government assistance to an ultra-Orthodox yeshiva student and his family of ten children is about 11,000 New Israeli Shekels (NIS) a month net or 17,000 NIS gross (approximately $4,000). Financial support for small families also runs into thousands of shekels every month.[33] Thus, in judging the behavior of religious actors toward the peace process it is important to remember that their actions do not necessarily reflect what they would do if they were ultimately responsible for policy. With this caveat in mind, the section below assesses the behavior of religious actors toward the peace process.


Figure 3. Levels of support for the Oslo process 1994–97. Data from Tamar Herman and Efraim Yaar, *Religious-Secular Relations in Israel* (Tel Aviv: Tami Steinmetz Centre for Peace, 1998) [Hebrew] pp. 62–67.

Direct Action

The religious settler movement *Gush Emunim* (Bloc of the Faithful) was responsible for founding the first illegal settlements in the territories in the 1970s, and they (and their various organizational offshoots) have led the way in setting up new settlements throughout the territories since then. Although many large settlements were subsequently set up by secular politicians such as Ariel Sharon and many secular people live in those settlements, there is no doubt that the religious community is disproportionally represented among the settlers and their political leadership.[34] Religious actors have also been especially prominent in terms of protests and demonstrations against the peace process. It was *Gush Emunim* that led the struggle against the withdrawal from the Sinai settlement of Yamit following the peace treaty with Egypt, and religious youth have struggled against the dismantling of illegal outposts in the West Bank recently.[35] The religious sector provided a large proportion of the people at demonstrations against the Oslo Accords.[36] Furthermore, extreme right-wing rabbis such as Chaim Druckman and two former Ashkenazi chief rabbis, Goren and Shapira, ruled that halacha requires religious soldiers to disobey any order to dismantle settlements.[37] Recently 500 Israeli rabbis signed a statement to this effect.[38] Finally, religious people committed the two major incidents of violence against the peace process perpetrated by civilian Israelis. In the mid-1980s the Jewish Underground, which grew out of *Gush Emunim*, attacked Arab mayors and plotted to blow up the Al-Aqsa Mosque on the Temple Mount. In 1995 a religious assailant, Yigal Amir, assassinated Prime Minister Rabin. He was apparently acting on the basis of a halachic ruling of extreme rabbis.[39] There have been rabbis and religious peace groups who have spoken out in favor of the peace process and against right-wing extremism. However, none of these have had anywhere near the amount of support among the religious public that *Gush Emunim* and other right-wing groups have enjoyed. The religious have not played an important role in left-wing direct action groups such as ''Peace Now.''[40] Nor were religious people involved in the ''track 2'' Israeli-Palestinian dialogue that led to the Oslo Accords.

Elections

Prior to 1996, the elections were conducted on the basis of a single ballot for a political party. The ultra-Orthodox population voted for their parties, without regard to their stance on the peace process. National-religious voters paid greater attention to parties' stance on the peace process. In 1981 the National Religious Party (NRP) dropped from twelve to six seats due, in part, to a shift of support to the far Right *Techiya* party.[41] In 1984 the NRP dropped to four seats, losing support to a more hawkish religious party, *Morasha*. Indeed the NRP only recovered its electoral strength in 1992, when it took an unequivocally right-wing stance by refusing to join a governing coalition led by the Left for the first time. In 1988 a moderate religious party, *Meimad*, was set up. However, it failed to achieve a single seat in the Knesset. The party did obtain representation in the Knesset from 1999 to 2003, but only through reserved slots on a joint list with the Labour Party. One of the main reasons that *Meimad* ran with Labour was that it was concerned that it could not muster enough support to gain representation in the Knesset if it ran alone.

In 1996 and 1999 the elections were run on a dual ballot system, with one vote going for a party and another for prime minister. In 2001, there was a special election

only for the prime minister. Unlike the vote for a party, which is based on a variety of considerations, the vote for prime minister is based more on attitudes toward the peace process. In 1996 and 1999 all the religious parties endorsed the right-wing candidate, Netanyahu, and the overwhelming majority of the religious public voted for him as well. In 1996, when the vote was extremely close, religiousness was the single most significant variable in differentiating Netanyahu from Peres supporters.[42] In 2001, the overwhelming majority of all voters backed the right-wing candidate, Ariel Sharon, though this time the ultra-Orthodox leadership called on their followers not to take part in the vote. In 2003, the single ballot system was reintroduced. Surveys showed that the national-religious voted in larger numbers than average for the center Right and far Right.[43]

Coalition Politics and Peace Agreements

Since no party in Israel has ever received an absolute majority in a general election, the governing party is always dependent on smaller parties to form a stable coalition. Historically, religious parties have played a pivotal role in this process. In addition, religious politicians in the Knesset and the cabinet have helped determine policy. The behavior of the religious parties since the 1973 Yom Kippur War has generally oscillated between support for centrist and hawkish positions. With the rise of the ''Young Guard'' in the NRP in 1974, the party moved from a generally pragmatic to a relatively hawkish stance. Between 1974 and 1976 the party formed a kind of internal opposition within the government to Labour Prime Minister Rabin's policy through their support for the illegal settlements set up by *Gush Emunim*.[44] In 1977 the NRP clearly stated its preference for a government headed by the right-wing Likud, and was instrumental in helping Begin form a governing coalition.[45] In the 1980s, with the two main parties evenly balanced, the religious parties held the balance of power and their preference was generally for either a National Unity Government (NUG) or a narrow right-wing government. It was believed that the ultra-Orthodox would be prepared to join a left-wing coalition in return for massive financial support for their institutions. However, when Labour leader Shimon Peres tried to do just that in March 1990, he obtained the support of *Shas* but not that of the other ultra-Orthodox parties. Ultimately, Rabbi Shach preferred a right-wing government apparently because he believed that their more ethnocentric worldview was ultimately closer to religion than the more universalistic worldview of the Left. At the same time, other ultra-Orthodox MKs supported the Right based on the hawkish views of their leader, the Lubavitcher Rebbe.[46]

In the Knesset vote on the 1993 Oslo Accords, no religious party voted in favor, while all the religious parties voted against the 1995 Interim Agreement (Oslo II). In 1998, the NRP helped to bring down the right-wing Netanyahu government over the Wye Agreement, which mandated an Israeli withdrawal from a further 13 percent of the West Bank. Although the NRP joined the government led by Labour leader Ehud Barak in 1999, it led the internal opposition to Barak's peace policies. On the eve of the Camp David summit, the NRP and *Shas* left the government in protest at the concessions Barak was prepared to offer the Palestinians. Though *Shas* helped Barak to remain in power by supporting him from outside the government in November 2000, it ultimately abandoned Barak because of pressure from its hawkish supporters and activists. Finally, in the cabinet vote on the Clinton Framework for a Final Status Agreement between Israel and the Palestinians in December 2000, the

only religious member of the most left-wing cabinet in Israeli history, *Meimad* leader Rabbi Michael Melchior, was one of only two members of the cabinet that voted against the agreement.[47]

Still, religious parties have not always acted to advance a hawkish agenda. On a number of occasions they have adopted a centrist stance. For example, they supported the Camp David Accords and the peace agreement with Egypt initiated by Menachem Begin's Likud-led government. They also supported the 1994 peace treaty with Jordan, which was also supported by the Likud, *Shas*, and the ultra-Orthodox *Yahadut HaTora* party, all of which also supported the 1998 Wye Agreement initiated by the Netanyahu government. On very rare occasions religious politicians did take an unequivocally dovish stance. For example, in 1982 the head of the NRP, Zevulun Hammer, pushed for a commission of inquiry into the massacre of Palestinians by Israel's Lebanese Christian allies in the Sabra and Shatilla refugee camps, against the stance of Prime Minister Begin. Even in this instance other members of the NRP and the ultra-Orthodox parties opposed a commission of inquiry.[48] Only on one occasion has a religious party's behavior been crucial to the peace process, when in 1993 *Shas's* abstention on the Oslo Accords allowed the measure to obtain a majority in the Knesset. Even here the fact that *Shas* could not bring itself to actually vote for the Oslo Accords demonstrates that religion was hardly in the vanguard of the peace camp. The only religious parliamentary grouping to be truly part of the peace camp is *Meimad*. As part of the Labour governments in 1995–96 and 1999–2001, *Meimad* did not play a direct role in policy formation, but its presence in the government helped to counter attempts to totally delegitimize the peace process among the religious public. Overall then, the practical approach of religious actors toward the peace process has generally ranged from hawkish to centrist, and as such reflects relatively faithfully the general orientations and outlook of both the religious leadership and the religious masses.

Religion and Hawkishness: Understanding the Fundamental Correlation

The main question that emerges from the above survey of the relationship between religion and the peace process is why religion has become closely correlated with hawkishness since 1967. The answer has to do with the relationship between religion, Israeli political culture, and the historical process of postmodernization. According to Peled and Shafir,[49] Israeli political culture has always consisted of three citizenship discourses: republicanism, liberalism, and ethno-nationalism. The liberal discourse, with its emphasis on the individual and universal human rights, informs a dovish orientation to the peace process, the ethnonational discourse, which emphasizes collective Jewish ethno-national rights, is inclined toward hawkishness.[50] Though in tension, these discourses coexist within the consensual notion of Israel as a democratic Jewish state.[51] This synthesis was stabilized for many years by the third discourse, republicanism, which is theoretically compatible with the other two discourses. The republican discourse[52] relates to an ethos of active citizenship and voluntarism in service of the collective good. Since 1948, the main focus of republicanism has been service in the Israeli armed forces on the basis of the "nation in arms model." In terms of foreign relations and the peace process, republicanism emphasizes pragmatism and state security.[53]

The above analysis of the religious discourse regarding the conflict reveals that it is relatively more hawkish than the nonreligious discourse. Correspondingly, the

religious discourse is also far more ethnocentric than the nonreligious discourse—even among religious doves—while giving little expression to universalistic values associated with liberalism.[54] This ethnocentric orientation explains why religious doves tend to be closer in their outlook to nonreligious centrists than to nonreligious doves. Even though religious doves support the principle of "land for peace," their ethnocentrism leads them to be relatively suspicious of Arab intensions, while their lack of commitment to national self-determination as a *universal value* means that Israeli concessions are measured primarily by their value in terms of saving Jewish lives and not in terms of fulfilling Palestinian national rights.[55] For example, even while justifying the principle of "land for peace," Rabbi Shach reaffirmed his fundamental belief in the intrinsically anti-Semitic nature of non-Jews by reference to myths rooted in the Jewish religious tradition, namely that "Esau (the Gentiles) hates Jacob (the Jews)" and that the Jews are "a people that dwells alone."[56]

These myths also became important in Israeli political culture in the 1970s and 1980s, and they have remained particularly potent among religious and traditional Israelis.[57] This, in turn, indicates the way in which ethnocentrism has been particularly strong in these sections of Israeli society. Thus, Arian has demonstrated that strong adherence to the ethnocentric "People Apart" syndrome is highly correlated to hawkishness and that correspondingly religious Jews in Israel are the most prone to strongly adhere to the "People Apart" syndrome.[58] In other words, it is because the mass of religious Jews are more ethnocentric than the nonreligious that they adopt a more hawkish approach to the peace process.

This finding reinforces the argument of both Shils and Smith that religion generally serves to encourage ethnocentricity.[59] Shils argues that religion generates a sense of an in-group and an out-group that serves to encourage an ethnocentric orientation, even in those religions with a very universalistic ideology. This religious basis for group differentiation gives ethnocentricity a reified quality that heightens its resonance. Smith argues that this is especially relevant to the Jewish religious tradition, which places God's covenantal relationship with the Jewish people (rather than with the individual) at its center.

Still, the relationship between religion, ethnocentricity, and hawkishness is not of the either/or variety. Opinion surveys consistently demonstrate a progression whereby the ultra-Orthodox are the most hawkish, followed by the national-religious, the traditional, and finally the secular. This progression is related to the degree of segregation from nonreligious culture and society. Social and cultural segregation widens the physical and psychological distance between "them" and "us." This, in turn, heightens a sense of ethnocentricity and thus hawkishness. The degree of segregation also signals the extent of group hostility to the liberal values and secular lifestyles of nonreligious society that are viewed as a threat to religion. Thus, the ultra-Orthodox who are the most segregated from nonreligious society are, correspondingly, the most hawkish, followed by the national-religious and then traditional Jews.[60]

The above argument explains the difference between the religious and the non-religious on the attitudinal level. However, it does not account for the fact that the national-religious, who are less ethnocentric and more open to elements of liberalism than the ultra-Orthodox, are more hawkish in practice than the ultra-Orthodox. This is explained by their different ideologies. First, for most of the ultra-Orthodox leadership, the state of Israel is not of great religious significance and certainly not of messianic significance—thus maintaining control over all of *Eretz Yisrael* is not

a core value. In contrast, for most of the national-religious leadership the state of Israel is of messianic significance and consequently maintaining control over all of *Eretz Yisrael* is a core value. Second, ultra-Orthodox ideology does not encourage republicanism, whereas national-religious ideology does. The fact that the ultra-Orthodox do not view the state of Israel as having intrinsic religious significance means that they tend to adopt a political approach focused on their narrow sectional interests; the conflict with the Palestinians is thus not a central concern. In contrast, the national-religious, who view the state of Israel as of great religious significance, are far more republican in their approach. Consequently, they not only seek to protect their sectional interests but also try to actively influence general state policy, especially regarding the peace process. Finally, the hierarchical nature of ultra-Orthodox society allows their pragmatic leadership to generally constrain their public's hawkish instincts. This is much more difficult for the national-religious leadership to achieve, given that they have developed more democratic political structures.

Religion and Hawkishness: The Role of Historical Events and Processes

The question, however, remains as to why the strong correlation between religion and hawkishness only become apparent after 1967. If the correlation can be explained by the innate ethnocentric properties of religion or in terms of fundamental religious ideologies, then why did these factors apparently have no impact prior to the Six Day War? The answer to these questions requires analysis of the relationship of religion to changes in Israeli political culture.

In the 1930s, the leader of the hawkish Revisionist movement, Jabotinsky, recognized that his message was especially well received among religious Jews.[61] However, religious zionist leaders ''reluctantly'' accepted partition of the Holy Land and they also supported Labour's policy of restraint in response to Arab attacks.[62] The main hawkish groups prior to 1967 were not religious but rather secular nationalists inspired either by far Left or far Right ideologies. Thus in the 1950s, the main hawks hailed from *Herut*, the party of Revisionism, or from *Achdut Havoda*, the ''activist'' wing of the Labour movement. In contrast, prior to 1967 the religious parties did not focus on foreign policy. They felt threatened by secularism,[63] and consequently concentrated on nurturing religious institutions and protecting the role of religion in the state. This focus constrained the republicanism of the national-religious. As a result, the NRP generally deferred to *Mapai* on foreign policy. Still, when the NRP did express an opinion on foreign policy it was often moderate. Indeed, the leader of the NRP, Moshe Shapira, was actually one of the most dovish voices in Israeli cabinets from 1948 to 1967.[64] Prior to the Six Day War, although the religious public was apparently attracted to hawkishness, these sentiments were held in check by a moderate leadership that focused on sectional interests, which constrained their republicanism. Meanwhile, nonreligious ideologies promoted the most hawkish approach to the conflict.

The Impact of the Six Day War

One reason often put forward for the growth of the association between religion and hawkishness is the impact of the Six Day War.[65] The capture by Israeli forces of many holy sites (including the holiest site in Judaism, the Temple Mount) clearly bore great religious resonance. It is one thing to be passive about the conquest of

these areas, quite another to voluntarily agree to retreat from them. In addition, the experience of the war—in which the country went from the fear of a second Holocaust to an unprecedented military victory in less than a week—led many religious Jews to view matters in messianic terms. These feelings were evident not only among religious Zionists but also among some segments of the ultra-Orthodox community. The Six Day War made it easier for the ultra-Orthodox to identify with the agenda of the political Right as its main representatives, *Gush Emunim*, were religious—unlike their pre-1967 predecessors. Against this background, religious Jews tended to support retention of Israeli control over the areas captured in the war.

However, similar sentiments were also widespread throughout nonreligious Israeli society.[66] Secular Zionists such as Moshe Dayan also expressed euphoria at the return of the Jewish people to their "historic cradle."[67] As a result, immediately following the Six Day War public opinion in general was very hawkish. Subsequently public opinion moved in a dovish direction in response to events such as the 1982 Lebanon War and particularly the 1987–92 intifada.[68] While this general trend affected both the religious and nonreligious public, the religious public has remained consistently more hawkish than the nonreligious public. Thus, while the Six Day War clearly triggered the rise of hawkishness, the real question is why this orientation has remained stronger among the religious community ever since then. The answer to this question is related to changes in nonreligious Israeli society as much as to changes in religious society.

The Polarization of Israeli Political Culture and the Peace Process

Since at least the mid-1980s, within Israeli political culture there has been a general trend toward greater liberalism and individualism among the younger generation of secular Israelis.[69] Until the mid-1980s, the overall balance within Israeli political culture was weighed in favor of republicanism and ethno-nationalism, but since then republicanism has all but disappeared, ethno-nationalism has declined, and liberalism has gained significant strength. These trends have pushed Israel in a dovish direction. Thus, following the 1987–92 intifada, the decline of ethno-nationalism was apparent in the dramatic decrease in support for the territorial integrity of the land of Israel.[70] In addition, political and military leaders such as former Prime Ministers Rabin and Barak stated that part of the reason they felt it necessary to pursue a dovish policy was due to the erosion of the general public's fighting spirit, a reflection of the decline of the republican ethos.[71] The decline of the republican ethos was also brought on by the massive rise in the amount of ultra-Orthodox young men who received exemptions from army service, growing from a few hundred in the 1950s to around thirty thousand in the early 1990s.[72] Finally the growing liberal trend found expression in Israeli foreign policy through the rise of young, middle-class, liberal, dovish politicians in Meretz and the younger generation of Labour Party leaders.[73]

Yet within the national-religious community, from the 1960s onward the trend moved away from a moderate religious approach that was relatively liberal and valued elements of modernity on their own terms. This was accompanied by the rise of a more stringent extremist religious approach that was far more critical of modernity and nonreligious society as well as being ultra-nationalist in orientation. This approach was cultivated by the followers of Rabbi Zvi Yehuda Kook in religious boarding schools that were increasingly attended by the elite among national-religious youth. Both the ideology of the extremists and the social isolation of the

boarding schools served to further heighten the sense of ethno-national particularism among the national-religious community. Meanwhile, the success of the religious community in stemming the tide of secularization led national-religious youth to feel greater self-confidence. Subsequently they became critical of the NRP's narrow political agenda. Instead they wanted to adopt a more ambitious plan to influence the face of nonreligious Israeli society. The rise to the surface of this latent republican impulse, when fused with the religious ethno-nationalism described above, led to the creation of the voluntarist religious settler movement *Gush Emunim*.[74] In other words, the rise of *Gush Emunim* can be explained by the rise of the very orientations—republicanism and ethno-nationalism—that were on the wane in secular society.

The emergence of hawkishness as a factor in ultra-Orthodox politics is related to the increased role of the ultra-Orthodoxy masses in politics.[75] While this shift does not constitute full-blown republicanism, it is symptomatic of their increased sense of belonging. The rise of the Right to power in Israel in 1977 allowed the ultra-Orthodox to feel closer to the state because they perceived the right as more ethnocentric and more sympathetic to organized religion.[76] Subsequently, the ultra-Orthodox masses have become more interested in mainstream Israeli politics and this has had some impact on the peace process. For example, in 1996 the ultra-Orthodox leadership preferred to back Shimon Peres in the elections for prime minister, as his record on funding for ultra-Orthodox institutions was considered good, but pressure from below was a major factor that led them to adopt the opposite course of action.[77] Finally during the later stages of settlement construction, many ultra-Orthodox people moved to the territories in order to obtain cheap housing. This has given the community a certain interest in supporting the Right.[78]

To summarize, the reason religion has been so strongly correlated with hawkishness since 1967 is a function of changes in both religious and nonreligious society that found expression in the polarization of Israeli political culture. Whereas liberalism increased and ethno-nationalism and republicanism declined in secular society, the opposite processes occurred in religious society.

Religion, Postmodernization, and Israeli Political Culture

Thus far the explanation of the relationship between cultural change and the development of the strong correlation between religion and hawkishness after 1967 has been based on domestic forces. However, in order to explain why the religion-hawkishness correlation became so prominent, it has been argued that one has to take into account changes in secular society at least as much as changes in religious society. This process of liberalization is best explained by reference to the global process of postmodernization. Postmodernization also served to facilitate the cultural changes that occurred among the religious public described above.

According to Inglehart,[79] just as the shift from traditional to modern society involved a move from traditional to modern values, so advanced industrial societies are engaged in a process of postmodernization evident in the shift from modern to postmodern values. Postmodern orientations are differentiated from modern orientations by a greater tendency toward liberalism, individualism, and self-expression; much greater support for democracy, minority rights, and multiculturalism; and much less affinity with collectivism, nationalism, and organized religion.

Postmodern values begin to develop in advanced industrial societies when the level of income reaches $6,000–$7,000 per year (in 1990 U.S. dollars). However, the relationship between economic development and cultural change is not one to one. Rather it depends on the relative level of economic and existential security a person feels during childhood and adolescence. This subjective experience determines the basic cultural orientation of different generations. Thus the generation acculturated during the 1930s and 1940s under conditions of economic depression and war demonstrates a tendency toward modern "security" values, while those acculturated during the relatively peaceful and prosperous 1950s and 1960s demonstrate a tendency toward postmodern values, as they take prosperity and physical security more for granted and are consequently more concerned with "quality of life" values. This cohort formed the core of the European peace movement in the 1970s and subsequently provided an important basis for left-wing politics in the advanced industrial world. However, not all of this cohort adopted a postmodern outlook to the same degree; the process has been constrained by the effects of local culture, and especially religion. The more the dominant institutionalized religious doctrine of a country is collectivist, and the more it tends to view all aspects of life as within the purview of religion, the less inclined such a country is toward postmodernism, and vice versa. Thus historically Protestant countries are more postmodern than historically Catholic countries, all other things being equal.[80]

A recent survey has demonstrated that Israel has also followed this trajectory; it has become a moderately postmodern country.[81] As in other countries, postmodern orientations are prevalent among the younger generation of the middle class, represented by the parties of the Left, and strongly correlated with a dovish approach to foreign policy. However, not all of the middle-class younger generation adhered to a postmodern outlook. One group in particular bucked this trend—the religious.[82]

This can be explained by the fact that Orthodox Judaism puts the emphasis more on the collective than the individual and because it tends to view all aspects of life and society as coming under the purview of halacha. This makes it closer in its cultural effects to Catholicism than Protestantism. This effect is reinforced by the institutional separation of religious and nonreligious pupils in the educational system and, to a lesser degree, in other walks of life. Consequently the religious have been sheltered from some of the direct effects of postmodernization. In this way the failure of postmodernization to penetrate deeply into the consciousness of the religious public has contributed to the polarization within Israeli political culture that has led to religion being so closely correlated with hawkishness since 1967.

Postmodernization also contributed to this polarization by helping to facilitate the rise of radicalism within the religious community in two ways. First, postmodern societies are marked by the fact that they give greater legitimacy to cultural pluralism. This puts less pressure on groups with alternative values to conform to the mainstream nonreligious society.[83] The decrease in the pressure to conform has strengthened the more extreme, separatist, and hawkish orientation in the Orthodox Jewish community not only in Israel, but worldwide.[84] Second, according to Flanagan the shift away from politics based on material interests associated with "modernism" is not only to be found on the political Left, but also on the political Right. Thus "new Right" parties are based not on class interests, but on the rise of a young generation seeking to promote traditional social and religious values, including nationalism and a hawkish approach to foreign policy.[85] This process seems to have found expression in Israel as well as the of rise the idealistic "Young Guard" in the

NRP and *Gush Emunim* in the early 1970s, which put greater emphasis on "authenticity" and less emphasis on the material interests of the religious public.[86]

Conclusion

The Jewish religion advocates no single definitive approach to the conflict with the Palestinians. Analysis of the different approaches to the conflict adopted by the Orthodox religious community in Israel reveals that the leadership discourse and political behaviour of the national-religious was generally more hawkish than that of the ultra-Orthodox. The main reason for this is the prominence of a messianic ideology among the national-religious, who attach great religious significance to the state of Israel and its control over the Holy Land. However, in terms of general public attitudes the ultra-Orthodox were more hawkish than the national-religious because of their greater ethnocentricity.

While one cannot speak in terms of a singular religious approach to the conflict, analysis of the discourse, public opinion, and political behaviour of religious and nonreligious Israeli Jews have demonstrated that the religious have been significantly more hawkish than the nonreligious since 1967. At the cultural level, this is because religion in Israel reinforces ethnocentricity among the Jewish public, which in turn is highly correlated with hawkishness. This relationship between religion and ethnocentrism is both an intrinsic property of religion per se and of the specific content of the Jewish religion. This relationship is reinforced by the segregated religious lifestyle pursued by contemporary religious Jews in Israel. In other words, it is not religion per se that is hawkish, but rather it is the way religion engenders ethnocentrism that makes it correlate so strongly with hawkishness.

On the political level, however, the general correlation between religion and ethnocentricity is not sufficient to explain why religion only became manifest as the main font of hawkishness in the Israeli political arena after 1967. This is a function of the way religion interacted with changes in Israeli political culture. Whereas mainstream Israeli political culture has become more liberal, less ethnocentric, and less republican, religious political culture has moved in the opposite direction. The rise of ethnocentrism and republicanism among the religious has made their outlook more hawkish, while making them simultaneously more active in pursuit of hawkish objectives in practice. Meanwhile, the rise of liberalism and the decline of republicanism among the nonreligious public has made them increasingly dovish both as a matter of liberal principle and because they have become less willing to pay the price of endemic conflict.

This process of cultural polarization was driven and facilitated by the process of postmodernization. In advanced industrial societies postmodernization generates a more liberal and more dovish middle-class, younger generation. The same process occurred among nonreligious Israelis. However, in Israel, religion shielded its adherents from most of the effects of postmodernization while simultaneously encouraging countervailing trends, which accounts for the polarization referred to above. In other words, the centrality of religion in promoting hawkishness since 1967 is not primarily a function of religion's discrete internal properties. Rather, it is the way religion has interacted with the process of postmodernization that has made it the most effective incubator for hawkishness in Israel since 1967.

In terms of the wider application of these findings to other conflicts, two hypotheses can be proposed. First, that the "inside-out" relationship between religion and ethnicity explains how religion generates ethnocentrism, which in turn generates

hawkish orientations. Second, that the ''outside-in'' relationship between postmodernization and religion explains how and why religious orientations toward conflict increasingly diverge from nonreligious orientations, and why they become prominent in advanced industrial societies. It would make the most sense to test these hypotheses with regard to comparable international or ethno-religious conflicts occurring in advanced industrial societies—for example, Northern Ireland.

Notes

1. On these issues see Jonathan Fox, ''Towards a Dynamic Theory of Ethno-Religious Conflict'' *Nations and Nationalism* 5, no. 4 (1999): 431–63; Jonathan Fox, ''Religion as an Overlooked Element in International Relations,'' *International Studies Review* 3, no. 3, (2001).

2. Nonorthodox variants of the Jewish religion are excluded from analysis because they attract only a very small number of adherents in Israel. It is also beyond the scope of this article to discuss the role of religion among the 20 percent of non-Jewish Israelis.

3. On the relationship between Judaism and Israeli national identity and orientations toward the peace process, see Anthony Smith, ''Sacred Territories and National Conflict'' *Israel Affairs* 5, no. 4 (1999): 13–31; Charles Liebman and Eliezer Don-Yehiya, *Civil Religion in Israel* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983).

4. Ronald Inglehart, *Modernisation and Postmodernisation* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), 53–74. Inglehart's earlier research referred to the shift from material values to postmaterial values, but recently he has framed this shift within the broader shift from modernity to postmodernity. For the purposes of clarity, the term postmodernization will be used consistently even when referring to Inglehart's earlier work.

5. In the context of Israeli society, the term Sephardi refers to Jews who immigrated to Israel from North Africa and Arab countries, while the term Ashkenazi refers to Jews who immigrated to Israel from Europe.

6. Rabbi Shach, ''On Eretz Israel and Territories'' in *The State of Israel and the land of Israel*, ed. Adam Doron (Bet Berl 1987–88): 504–505. [In Hebrew]

7. Avi Ravitsky, *Messianism, Zionism and Jewish Religious Radicalism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 211.

8. Habad is a worldwide Hassidic sect, which is differentiated from other such sects by its extensive efforts to encourage nonreligious Jews to become religious. *Hapoelei Agudat Yisrael* refers to a section of the ultra-Orthodox political party *Agudat Yisrael* formed by ultra-Orthodox Jews who set up communal agricultural settlements in Israel in the twentieth century. For further details see ibid., 181–206.

9. *Jerusalem Report*, February 27, 1992, 7.

10. See Norman Stillman, *Sephardi Religious Responses to Modernity* (Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Press, 1995); Meir Roumani, ''The Sephardi Factor in Israeli Politics,'' *Middle East Journal* 42, no. 3 (1988): 423–435.

11. Ovadia Yosef, ''Mesirat Shtachim Me'Ertz Yisrael Bimkom Pikuah Nefesh,'' in *Lectures Given at the 31st Conference of Tora Sheba'al Pe'eh*, ed. Yitzhak Rafael (Jerusalem: Mossad HaRav Kook, 1990). [In Hebrew]

12. Zvi Yehuda Kook, *Or Le Netivati* (Jerusalem: Z. Y. Kook Institute, 1989).

13. Ehud Sprinzak, *The Ascendance of Israel's Radical Right* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 122.

14. Rabbi Yehuda Amital, ''The Trap of the Whole Land of Israel,'' [In Hebrew] in *The State of Israel and the Land of Israel*, 495–503 (Bet Berl, 1988). for a detailed exposition of this view see Amnon Bazak, ed., 4th ed. *That You Shall Live by Them: A Conflict of Values* (Jerusalem: Temurot, 2000).

15. Yeshiyahu Leibovitz, *Judaism, Human Values and the Jewish State* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992), 223–51.

16. Jonathan Rynhold, ''Re-Conceptualising Israeli Approaches to the Palestinian Question'' *Israel Studies* 6, no. 2 (2001): 33–52.

17. Sprinsak, *Israel's Radical Right*.

18. David Cathala-Hall, *The Peace Movement in Israel 1967–87* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1989).

19. Ibid.; Rynhold "Re-Conceptualising Israeli Approaches."

20. Bazak, *That You Shall Live*.

21. Amital, "The Trap," Ilan Grielsammer, "Campaign Strategies of the Religious Parties," in *The Elections in Israel 1984*, eds. Asher Arian and Michal Shamir, 84 (Tel Aviv: Ramot, 1986).

22. Rynhold, "Re-Conceptualising Israeli Approaches."

23. Shach, *On Eretz Israel*; Yosef, "Mesirat Shtachim."

24. Bazak, *That You Shall Live*, 65–66.

25. Efriam Inbar, Gad Barzillai, and Giora Goldberg, "Positions on National Security of Israel's Ultra-Orthodox Political Leadership" *Journal of Developing Societies* 13, no, 2 (1997).

26. *Jerusalem Post* September 26, 1991; *Israeline*, December 29, 1995.

27. Gil Hoffman, "Shas Leader Reverses Land-for-Peace Ruling," *Jerusalem Post*, January 28, 2003.

28. Shlomit Levy, Hanna Levinsohn, and Elihu Katz, *A Portrait of Israeli Jews* (Jerusalem: Israeli Democracy Institute, 2002); Tamar Herman and Efraim Yaar, *Religious-Secular Relations in Israel* [In Hebrew] (Tel Aviv: Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace, 1998).

29. Yael Yishai, *Land or Peace?* (Stanford: Hoover Institute, 1987), 185.

30. Asher Arian, *Security Threatened* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 115–19.

31. Herman and Yaar, *Religious-Secular*, 62–67.

32. Asher Arian, *Israeli Public Opinion on National Security 2002* (Tel Aviv: Jaffe Center for Strategic Studies, 2002).

33. http://www.haaretz.co.il/hasite/pages/QAHeb.jhtml?qaNo = 60. In terms of ultra-Orthodox institutions, 204 million NIS of the government budget was allotted for ultra-Orthodox boarding schools in 1999, while the overall budget for yeshivas jumped from 640 million NIS in 1996 to nearly 900 million in 1999 (approximately $220 million). See Shachar Ilan, *Haredim Ba'am* (Jerusalem: Keter, 2000), 128–29. In 2001 the *Shas* educational system received more than 220 million NIS from the education budget, while a further 65 million NIS was spent on ultra-Orthodox cultural activities, see *Ministry of Education Annual Audit 2002*, [In Hebrew] http://207.232.9.131/hofesh/din_2002_7_8.htm.

34. David Newman, "Reflections on 25 Years of Settlement Activity in the West Bank" *Israel Affairs* 3, no. 1 (1996): 65–83.

35. Nadav Shragai, "Evacuations Proceed amid Clashes," *Ha'aretz*, June 27, 2003.

36. For example, Heidi Gleit, "Masses Turn Out against Summit," *Jerusalem Post*, July 17, 2000.

37. Stuart Cohen, *The Scroll or the Sword?* (Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1997), 27–31; Margot Dudkevitch, "Officer Jailed for Refusing to Dismantle Outpost," *Jerusalem Post*, June 29, 2003.

38. Nadav Shragai, "Rabbis: No Government Has the Right to Set up a Foreign State in the Land of Israel," *Ha'aretz*, June 24, 2003.

39. Samuel Peleg, "They Shoot Prime Ministers Too, Don't They? Religious Violence in Israel" *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 20, no. 1 (1997): 227–47.

40. Mordechai Bar-On, *In Pursuit of Peace* (Washington DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, 1996).

41. Shmuel Sandler, "The Religious Parties," in *Israel at the Polls 1981*, eds. Howard Penniman and Daniel Elazar (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), 105–27.

42. Asher Arian and Michal Shamir, "Candidates, Parties and Blocs," in *The Elections in Israel 1999*, eds. Asher Arian and Michal Shamir (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2000). The figures were generally over 95 percent in favour of Netanyahu in ultra-Orthodox districts see http://www.knesset.gov.il/elections/index.html.

43. Asher Cohen, "2003: Restless Youngsters" [In Hebrew] *Meimad Journal* 26 (2003): 2–6.

44. Charles Liebman and Eliezer Don-Yehiya, *Religion and Politics in Israel* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), 107–111.

45. Sandler, "The Religious Parties," 118.

46. *Ha'aretz*, March 28, 1990; *Jerusalem Post*, April 6, 1990.

47. See Jonathan Rynhold and Gerald Steinberg, "The Peace Process and the Elections," in *Israel at the Polls 2003*, eds. Shmuel Sandler and Jonathan Rynhold (London: Frank Cass, 2004).

48. Grielsammer, "Campaign Strategies," 83.

49. Yoav Peled and Gershon Shafir, "The Roots of Peacemaking: The Dynamics of Citizenship in Israel," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 28, no. 3 (1996): 391–413.

50. Shmuel Sandler, *Land of Israel, State of Israel: Ethnonationalism in Israeli Foreign Policy* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1993).

51. On these tensions, see Ruth Gavison, "Jewish and Democratic? A Rejoinder to the 'Ethnic Democracy' Debate," *Israel Studies* 4, no. 1 (1999): 44–72.

52. On republicanism, see Daniel Elazar, *Covenant and Civil Society: The Constitutional Matrix of Modern Democracy* (New Brunswick: Transaction, 1998).

53. Rynhold (note 18). Republicanism is also referred to in the literature as statism.

54. Especially since the Rabin assassination efforts have been made to remedy this, see the journal *Judaism and Democracy* [In Hebrew] (Ramat Gan: Bar Ilan University Press).

55. On the relative paucity of universal values within the halachic discourse on politics, see Gerald Blidstein, "Halacha and Democracy," *Tradition* 21, no. 1 (1997): 8–37.

56. Shach, *On Eretz Israel*.

57. Liebman and Don-Yehiya, *Civil Religion*.

58. Arian, *Security Threatened*, 178–186.

59. Edward Shils, "Nation, Nationality, Nationalism and Civil Society," *Nations and Nationalism* 1, no. 1 (1995): 93–112; Smith, "Sacred Territories."

60. The ultra-Orthodox maintain their own separate educational system and their own press. They do not watch television or mix socially with nonreligious Jews. A large proportion of the men are not part of the general workforce and almost none serve in the army.

61. Yonathan Shapria, *The Road to Power: Herut Party in Israel* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991), 19.

62. Cohen, *The Scroll*, 28.

63. Liebman and Don-Yehiya, *Religion and Politics*, chapter 2.

64. Michael Brecher, *The Foreign Policy System of Israel* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972), 169–74, 179–80.

65. Michael Rosenak, "Religious Reactions: Testimony and Theology," in *The Impact of the Six Day War*, ed. Stephen Roth (Basingstoke: MacMillan, 1988): 209–31.

66. Amnon Rubinstein, *The Zionist Dream Revisited* (New York: Shocken, 1981), chapter 6.

67. Moshe Dayan, *Mapa Hadasha* (Tel Aviv: Maariv, 1969), 173.

68. Yishai, *Land or Peace?*, chapter 6; Arian (note 31) chapter 4. The Lebanon War was the catalyst for the foundation of the religious peace movement *Netivot Shalom*. Its founder and leader, Rabbi Amital, was formerly identified with *Gush Emunim*.

69. Peled and Shafir, "Roots of Peacemaking."

70. Arian, "*Security Threatened*, 30–31.

71. Jonathan Rynhold, "Barak, the Israeli Left and the Oslo Peace Process," *Israel Studies Forum* 19, no. 1, (2003): 9–33.

72. Ilan, *Haredim Ba'am*.

73. Peled and Shafir, "Roots of Peacemaking."

74. Liebman and Don-Yehiya, *Religion and Politics*, 102–37.

75. Yair Sheleg, *HaDati'im HeChadashim* (Jerusalem: Keter, 2000).

76. Nadav Shragai, "Religious, Right-Wing and Realistic," *Ha'aretz*, February 15, 2001; Aryeh Dayan, "A Haredi Home in the Likud," *Ha'aretz*, November 21, 2002.

77. Sheleg, *HaDati'im*, 164.

78. Shragai, "Religious, Right-Wing," Nadav Shragai, "Dizzying Growth in Haredi Betar Ilit in West Bank," *Ha'aretz*, July 13, 2003.

79. Inglehart, *Modernisation and Postmodernisation*.

80. Ibid, 80–107.

81. Ephraim Ya'ar, "Value Prioritisation in Israeli Society," *Comparative Sociology* 1, no. 3–4 (2002): 347–68.

82. Ibid.

83. Inglehart, *Modernisation and Postmedernisation*, 22–23.

84. Samuel Heilman and Steven Cohen, *Cosmopolitans and Parochials: Modern Orthodoxy in America* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1989).

85. Ronald Inglehart and Scott Flanagan, "Controversies: Value Change in Industrial Societies," *American Political Science Review* 81, no. 4 (1987): 306–08.

86. Liebman and Don-Yehiya, *Religion and Politics*, 102–106, 113–14, 127.